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We are now in the final weeks of campaigning before Italy’s constitutional referendum on 4
December. As part of our coverage of the referendum, Mattia Guidi makes the case for why Italians
should support the proposed reform. He argues that much of the criticism of the reform is unfounded
and that it would ultimately bring Italy closer to the parliamentary systems used in other European
countries.
Interested in other points of view? Check out EUROPP’s full coverage of Italy’s
constitutional referendum.
The referendum on the constitutional reform approved last April by the Italian parliament, to be held on 4 December,
is polarising Italy’s party system and Italian society like few other issues have ever done before. Most political
parties, on the left and on the right, are against the referendum. Even within the party that more than any other has
contributed to the reform, the Democratic Party, there are important groups that are campaigning for a no vote. If the
referendum had to be decided only on the basis of what parties suggest, the no vote should obtain a landslide
victory.
For the time being, the situation appears more balanced: a slight majority (around 52-53%) of those who intend to
vote are apparently willing to reject the reform, but the final result is still uncertain. In this piece, I intend to briefly
summarise the content of the reform and then discuss some of the most common criticisms. My aim to is to show
that the reform, despite its inevitable compromises, is a step forward because it would bring Italy closer to most
parliamentary systems used in other countries without endangering the democratic nature of our Constitution.
What the reform contains and why criticism is wide of the mark
The content of the reform can be summarised in a few points:
The unique form of bicameralism used in Italy, with two chambers that are both directly elected, have to pass
motions of confidence for the government to enter into office, and must agree on every piece of legislation,
will be reformed. The lower chamber remains directly elected and keeps a ‘confidence relationship’ with the
executive. The Senate becomes a chamber composed of members of regional assemblies and mayors,
which will not vote on motions of confidence and has significantly reduced powers in passing legislation.
The government will be given the capacity to ask the lower chamber to examine draft bills in a relatively short
period of time (85 days). However, at the same time, the government’s power to pass decree-laws will be
constrained.
Instruments of direct democracy (referendums and popular legislative initiative) will be strengthened: if
referendums to abrogate laws are supported by more than 800,000 voters, the quorum for their validity will be
reduced to 50%+1 of the voters at previous general elections; referendums to pass laws will become
possible; and the discussion of bills proposed by the people will become mandatory for the parliament.
A number of competences which had been devolved to regions in 2001 are set to be returned to the state.
Critiques of the reforms come in various shapes and sizes. For instance, many opponents argue that Italy’s current
form of bicameralism is necessary to maintain a system of “checks and balances”: if the reform passes, the
government risks becoming too powerful. This criticism ignores that Italy is the only system in the world in which
both chambers can carry out votes of confidence in the government and must agree on every bill. The reform would
1/3
bring the Italian system closer to other bicameral systems, in which only the lower chamber retains a confidence
relationship with the government, and the other chamber (almost everywhere indirectly elected, like the reformed
Italian Senate) has more limited legislative powers.
Another common criticism concerns the nature of the new differentiated procedures for passing bills. Opponents of
the reform criticise the complexity of the article describing these procedures. Obviously, stating that both chambers
must agree on every bill is quicker than specifying differentiated procedures. But this argument clearly disregards
the fact that differentiated legislative powers require constitutions to specify precisely which procedures are applied
for specific types of laws, and how the procedures themselves work (for a comparative assessment, see, for
example, Articles 76, 77 and 78 of the German Constitution ).
It is also argued that the new legislative process would be less efficient and would generate confusion over the two
chambers’ competences. Yet the reform would give the lower chamber the last word on almost every bill. Therefore,
it is highly unlikely that the Senate would exercise its power to examine bills on every new piece of legislation. It
would most likely focus on the limited number of bills for which it has full competence and on bills whose impact is
crucial for the regions.
Regarding the government’s power to ask the lower chamber for a ‘fast track’ procedure for important bills, this is
often criticised as an intolerable increase of the executive’s power. But looking closely at the text, we can see that
the government would just have the power to ask the chamber to vote on a bill within 70 days, which can be
extended to 85.
A few things must be noted here. First, 85 days would be almost three months to examine a bill. Second, the lower
house can refuse to comply with the government’s request. And third, the parliament is free to amend the bill as it
wishes (it is not a vote on a text drafted by the government, as in the case of France’s vote bloqué). All in all, it would
be nothing more that the government declaring a bill important and asking the parliament to examine it relatively
quickly. This is not exactly the death of parliamentary democracy. Moreover, the government’s power to pass
decree-laws would also be reduced at the same time.
A more formal argument against the reform regards the majority that supported it in parliament. It is often argued
that this majority was ‘slim’ and therefore inappropriate for a reform of this kind, which would require broader
majorities. But is this a real point of concern? In the drafting of the reform all parties in parliament were involved
(even the Five Star Movement which nevertheless refused to participate). In particular, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza
Italia and the Northern League significantly contributed (Forza Italia even voted for the reform at the first reading in
the Senate). The majority in favour of the reform, in both chambers, has never gone below 56% of members – and
let us remember here that, in the Senate, Renzi’s Democratic Party has only 33% of the seats.
The Constitution itself allows constitutional amendments to be adopted by an absolute majority of members (instead
of two thirds) of each chamber, making it possible to hold a referendum in that case (which is exactly the present
scenario). In a fragmented and polarised parliament like ours, these majorities are not easily achievable, and will be
even more difficult to reach in the future. Passing the reform has required long negotiations and a process that has
lasted almost two years (let alone the fact that most of these modifications have been discussed, and unsuccessfully
attempted, for decades). Presenting the reform as a take-it-or-leave-it package that has been passed thanks to
party discipline is greatly misleading. There has obviously been discipline in the parties involved, but this has been
possible because many aspects of the reform have been amended during the process. This is evident if we simply
look at the modifications introduced in the constitutional reform process. Ultimately, parliament has worked a great
deal on the text that was agreed.
Great emphasis is also placed by the no campaign on the electoral system, which is considered too rigid and likely
to transform electoral minorities into artificial majorities in parliament. Part of the criticism of the electoral law is well
motivated. However, the electoral law is not part of the reform. It is an ordinary law, which can be modified by the
parliament at any time with no special procedures, and which can also be partly cancelled through referendum. On
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top of that, the Constitutional Court will examine the new electoral system next January, and it will rule on its
compliance with the Constitution.
What is more, the reform that opponents reject would allow one fifth of MPs to ask for a preventive judgment from
the Constitutional Court on every new electoral law (and, exceptionally, on the current electoral law as well). Last but
not least, there is an explicit commitment of the Democratic Party to change the electoral system. Presenting the
electoral system as a ‘building block’ of the Constitutional reform is simply not correct, and it does not help in making
a fair assessment of the reform. Rejecting a reform that has required many years, qualified majorities, and six
readings to be passed because of disagreement on the content of the electoral law (which can be changed in a few
weeks) is a decidedly odd approach to take.
Finally, and more generally, critics complain that the reform would create a kind of de facto presidential system. This
is also an odd accusation given the reform mandates that the prime minister cannot appoint or dismiss ministers
autonomously; the prime minister cannot even ask to dissolve the lower chamber; a vote of no confidence can be
passed without requiring the chamber to propose a new prime minister (there is no constructive vote of no
confidence); and the government’s only power vis-à-vis the lower chamber is that of being allowed to ask the lower
chamber for a vote on a bill within three months. If these accusations were true, we would be obliged to say that
countries like Spain, the UK, and Germany are already de facto presidential systems, since the prime ministers in
these countries are already more powerful than what the Italian prime minister would be after the reform.
In conclusion, the reform has a significant positive contribution: it effectively differentiates (in composition and
functions) between the two parliamentary chambers. This is a long awaited reform which was extremely hard to
achieve − considering that directly elected senators have voted to suppress their own body − and would most likely
not be achievable for a substantial period of time if the reform is rejected.
The reform ultimately makes the Italian institutional structure less eccentric and more similar to that of other
parliamentary democracies, getting rid of an absurd bicameral system which neither contributes to the quality and
speed of legislation nor to government stability. It is normal to have reservations over particular aspects of a
package of reforms − when such a comprehensive reform is passed, with such a complex procedure and several
compromises in parliament, inconsistencies are unavoidable − but the overall result is that we would get closer to
more ‘normal’ parliamentary systems. If the reform is rejected, we remain outliers. This is why I believe we should
approve it.
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